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MARCH-APRIL, 1961
NEGLIGENCE - RES IPSA LOQUITUR
The plaintiff, Flora Hook, accompanied a group of young men
and women to the Lakeside Park. After riding on some of the
amusement devices, Miss Hook purchased a ticket for a ride on the
Loop-O-Plane. Seated inside the car, she took hold of a metal cross
bar as the car rocked back and forth and then swung through a
complete revolution. On this first circle, she lost her grip on the
cross bar and the upper part of her body jacknifed forward in a
sudden violent movement causing her to strike her head on the
floor of the car. As a result of this accident the plaintiff sustained
a broken back.
The trial was predicated on defendant's alleged negligent main-
tenance and operation of the amusement device. The trial court
dismissed the complaint at the close of plaintiff's case. Two points
were specified for reversal on appeal: That an adequate case was
made out before the trial court either on the theory of 1) simple or
common law negligence or 2) res ipsa loquitur. The Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court's ruling in a five to two decision,' holding
that the evidence was insufficient to support any inference of negli-
gence and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did not serve to supply
the deficiencies.2 Hook v. Lakeside Park Co., 351 P.2d 261 (Colo.
1960).
The latin phrase "res ipsa loquitur," meaning simply that "the
thing speaks for itself," is the offspring of a casual word of Baron
Pollock in a case in 18633 in which a barrel of flour rolled out of a
warehouse and fell upon a passing pedestrian. The development of
the rule in this country has been characterized by uncertainty and
confusion and has become the source of so much trouble to the
courts that the use of the phrase itself is an obstacle to clear
thought.
This enigmatic theme of inconsistency and confusion which has
come to characterize the doctrine of res ipsa is readily revealed by
a review of the decisions on the subject in this state.4 The scope of
this comment will therefore be primarily confined to the determina-
tion of whether the principles of the doctrine enunciated in the in-
stant case serve as increments of reason to stabilize and clarify an
otherwise anomalous doctrine or as catalysts in precipitating fur-
ther confusion.
The court , tablished a formula in the instant case to be util-
ized in determining whether a particular case calls for the applica-
tion of res ipsa loquitur. This formula embodies the three condi-
tions which are usually stated as necessary to set the doctrine into
operation, namely: 1) that the instrumentality is under the exclu-
sive control of the defendant, 2) that the accident is of a kind which
1 The dissenters believed that the plaintiff made out a prima facie case and that the circum-
stances presented a clear case for the application of res ipsa loquitur, citing Weiss v. Axler, 137
Colo. 544, 328 P.2d 88 (1958), as being appropriately analogous.
2 A petition for rehearing of the Hook case was denied. Mr. Justice Moore, who formerly con-
curred, jained with the two dissenters at this time. 351 P.2d 261 (Colo. 1960).
3 Byrne v. Boadle, 2 H. & C. 722, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (1863).




ordinarily does not occur in the absence of defendant's negligence,
and 3) that it must not have been due to any voluntary act or con-
tribution on the part of the plaintiff.5 Fragments of the formula set
forth in the Hook decision have appeared in most of the res ipsa
cases in this state, but nowhere in this context and in as clear and
succinct a form.6 Perhaps the best coverage of these conditions in
general terms is found in Denver Consolidated Electric Co. v. Lawr-
ence.7 This formula is consistent with the general principle ad-
hered to in the majority of the cases in this state to the effect that
the mere fact that an accident or an injury has occurred, with noth-
ing more, is not sufficient to invoke the rule.' An apparent excep-
tion to this rule was early expressed in the common carrier cases.9
The earliest of these decisions in this state is Kansas Pacific Ry. Co.
v. Miller,10 where the court stated that in case of alleged injuries by
stage coach or railroad accidents, the presumption of negligence
arises from the mere fact that the accident occurred. This view is
in accord with the common law rule as stated in the leading case of
Christie v. Griggs," where Sir James Mansfield remarked that the
plaintiff had made out his case prima facie by proving-his going on
the coach, the accident, and that he had suffered damage. The rea-
son sometimes given for this principle is that the carrier's duty of
the highest care toward its passengers in effect makes it the insurer
of the passenger's safety. However, the court in the instant case
held the following view: "It does not follow, however, that an op-
erator of an amusement device, such as defendant, is an insurer of
5 Prosser, Torts 201 (2d ed. 1955); Harper & James, Torts, § 19.5 (1956). Also, see Wigmore,
Evidence, 2509 (3d ed. 1940).
6 Gylling v. Hinds, 122 Colo. 345, 222 P.2d 413 (1950); Home Public Market v. Newrock, 111 Colo.
428, 142 P.2d 272 (1943); Denver Tramway Corp. v. Kuttner, 95 Colo. 312, 35 P.2d 852 (1934);
Yellow Cab Co. v. Hodgson, 91 Colo. 365, 14 P.2d 1081 (1932); Velotto v. Yampa Valley Coal Co.,
63 Colo. 489, 167 Pac. 971 (1917); Sanderson v. Frazier, 8 Colo. 79, 5 Pac. 632 (1884).
7 31 Colo. 301, 73 Pac. 39 (1903).
8 Weber v. Gamble Building Co., 345 P.2d 727 (Colo. 1959); National Co. v. Holt, 137 Colo. 208,
322 P.2d 1046 (1958); Perry Co. v. Ruybal, 133 Colo. 502, 297 P.2d 531 (1956); Grand Junction v.
Lashmett, 126 Colo. 256, 247 P.2d 909 (1952); Maloney v. Jussel, 125 Cola. 125, 241 P.2d 862 (1952);
Salliman v. Silk, 118 Colo. 220, 194 P.2d 304 (1948); Home Public Market v. Newrock, 111 Colo. 428,
142 P.2d 272 (1943); Berkens v. Denver Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 109 Colo. 140, 122 P.2d 884 (1942);
Denver Tramway Corp. v. Kuttner, 95 Colo. 312, 35 P.2d 852 (1934); Clune v. Mercereau, 89 Colo.
227, 1 P.2d 101 (1931); McMillan v. Keck, 82 Colo. 434, 260 Pac. 1079 (1927); Denver Co. v. Thompson,
65 Cola: 4, 169 Pac. 539 (1917); Velotta v. Yampa Valley Coal Co., 63 Colo. 489, 167 Poc. 971 (1917).
9 Sanderson v. Frazier, 8 Colo. 79, 5 Pac. 632 (1884); Wall v. Livesay, 6 Colo. 465 (1882); Denver,
S.P. & P. Ry. Co. v. Woodward, Administrator, 4 Colo. 1 (1877); Kansas Pacific Railway Co. v.
Miller, 2 Colo. 442 (1874).
10 2 Colo. 442 (1874).






the passenger's safety. The presumptions and inferences available
to a passenger in an action against a carrier are not available in
such circumstances."
12
The dissent recognized a fourth element which is found in sev-
eral decisions in this state, i.e., that evidence as to the true explana-
tion of the accident must be more readily accessible to the defend-
ant than to the plaintiff. 13 The reasoning usually employed in sup-
port of this proposition is aptly stated in Denver Tramway Corp. v.
Kuttner14 to the effect that the doctrine of res ipsa is necessary to
prevent a miscarriage of justice in negligence cases where the in-
jured party is either comparatively or totally ignorant of the cause
of the accident. The court then proceeded to a conclusion which
effectively summarizes the general philosophy accorded the doc-
trine of res ipsa in this state: "It is a doctrine that must be kept
within comparatively narrow limits, lest a desire to promote justice
bring about the defeat of justice instead." A corollary of this fourth
element is that where the plaintiff has equal or superior means of
information as to the cause of the accident, the doctrine will not be
invoked. 15 Dean Prosser states that this fourth element is of dubi-
ous validity in a res ipsa case, but adds that the plaintiff's compara-
tive ignorance of the facts undoubtedly has some persuasive effect
in making some courts more willing to apply the doctrine. 6
A second point covered by the majority opinion relates to the
question as to whether the fact that the plaintiff elects to stand
upon specific allegations of negligence in pleadings at trial operates
as a waiver of the benefits of res ipsa loquitur. The court held that
it was quite generally agreed that the introduction of evidence
which does not purport to furnish a complete explanation of the
occurrance does not deprive the plaintiff of res ipsa. The court
cited four Colorado cases in support of this principle.17 However,
with deference to the learned court, a careful reading of these cases
and others dealing with this rule reveals that no such general agree-
ment exists in this state on this point. The principal authority for
the proposition cited by the court is Scott v. Greeley Joslin Store
Co.," ' which was later adhered to in the landmark case of Weiss v.
Axler.' 9 However, contrary to this holding are two recent decisions,
St. Luke's Hospital Ass'n v. Long20 and Brighton v. DeGregario.
2]
In the St. Luke's case the court stated that the plaintiffs were un-
able to present evidence as to the actual cause of the death, and
that the defendant's by their broad denial would have made appli-
cable the rule of res ipsa loquitur had no specific proof as to the
cause of the death been produced. In an extensive survey of the
12 Hook v. Lakeside Park Company, 351 P.2d at 265, (Colo. 1960).
13 Denver Consolidated Electric Co. v. Lawrence, supra note 11. Accord, Boulder Valley Co. v.
Jernberg, 118 Colo. 486, 197 P.2d 155 (1948); Denver Tramway Corp. v. Kuttner, 95 Colo. 312, 35 P.2d
852 (1934); Yellow Cab Co. v. Hodgson, 91 Cola. 365, 14 P.2d 1081 (1932); Velotta v. Yampa Volley
Coal Co., 63 Colo. 489, 167 Pac. 971 (1917).
14 95 Colo. at 315, 35 P.2d at 853 (1934).
15 Boulder Valley Co. v. Jernberg, 118 Colo. 486, 197 P.2d 155 (1948); Yellow Cab Co. v. Hodgson,
91 Colo. 365, 14 P.2d 1081 (1932). Reaffirmed in National Co. v. Holt, 137 Colo. 208, 322 P.2d 1046
(1958).
16 Prosser, Torts, § 42 (2d ed 1955).
17 Brighton v. DeGregario, 136 Colo. 1, 314 P.2d 276 (1957); Scott v. Greeley Joslin Store Co.,
125 Colo. 367, 243 P.2d 394 (1952); Zimmerman v. Franzen, 121 Colo. 574, 200 P.2d 344 (1950);
Rudolph v. Elder, 105 Colo. 105, 95 P.2d 827 (1939).
18 125 Colo. 367, 243 P.2d 394 (1952).
19 137 Colo. 544, 328 P.2d 88 (1958).
20 125 Colo. 25, 240 P.2d 917 (1952).
21 136 Colo. 1, 314 P.2d 276 (1957).
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various applications of the doctrine of res ipsa in the United States,22
Dean Prosser stated that the plaintiff should be limited by his alle-
gations, as the function of specific pleading is to limit proof. A sec-
ondary purpose in this respect is to avert undue hardship on the
part of the defendant in requiring him to meet inferences based on
a theory which is advanced for the first time at the trial. In this
respect, it is interesting to note that res ipsa loquitur was inter-
posed in the instant case for the first time in the appellate court.
The court held that this did not deprive the plaintiff of the use of
the doctrine.
A tertiary incident of import to the applicability of the doc-
trine of res ipsa in a given case set forth in the Hook decision re-
lates to the availability of evidence, necessary in attaching neglig-
ence, to the defendant. Following the principle laid down by the
United States Supreme Court in Johnson v. United States, 23 the
court stated that res ipsa loquitur was a "rule of necessity to be in-
voked only where the necessary evidence is absent and not readily
available, ' ' 24 and that where it appears that such evidence is readily
available and the plaintiff fails to present it, the doctrine cannot be
invoked to supply the deficiencies. However, it should be noted
that Justice Frankfurter, in the Johnson case, recommended a new
trial and an adequate adjudication based upon a determination of
this issue.
25
The final aspect presented by the instant case concerns the ap-
plicability vel non of res ipsa loquitur where the uncontroverted
evidence presented by the plaintiff is such that there exists a bal-
ance of possibilities as to the cause of the accident. The recurrence
of the term "possibility" in negligence cases has long been a source
of irritation in the law.26 However, the courts of this state have
held with practical unanimity that where the evidence tends to
show that the accident is just as reasonably attributable to causes
other than that of the negligence of the defendant, the doctrine of
res ipsa cannot be invoked. 27  This result was well expressed in
Elkton v. Sullivan,28 in which the court said: "A resort to mere
conjecture or possibilities will not take the place of direct or cir-
cumstantial evidence. No number of mere possibilities will estab-
lish a probability." The court in the instant case held that where
the happening is not such as to point to negligence as the pre-
dominant or even the equal explanation, the vagueness and am-
biguousness of plaintiff's evidence operates to defeat her claim.
A review of the recent decisions concerning res ipso impresses
one with the supreme effort being made by our appellate courts to
transform into a precise and symmetrical form the "monster child"
22 Prosser, The Procedural Effect of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 20 Minn. L. Rev. 241 (1936).
23 333 U.S. 46 (1947). Dissenting opinion of Justice Frankfurter.
24 Id. at 395; Cooley, Torts, § 480 (4th ed. 1932).
25 Johnson v. United States, supra, note 23.
26 Kramer Service, Inc. v. Wilkins, 184 Miss. 483, 186 So. 625 (1939) where the court stated: "There
is one heresy in the judicial forum which appears to be Hydraheaded, and although cut off again
and again, has the characteristic of an endless renewal. That heresy is that proof that a post event
possibly happened, or that a certain result was possibly caused by a past event, is sutficient, in
probative force to take the question to the jury. Such was never the low in this state, and we are
in accord with almost all of the other common low states."
27 Coakley v. Hayes, 121 Colo. 303, 215 F.2d 901 (1950); Salliman v. Silk, 118 Colo. 220, 194 P.2d
304, (1948); Clune v. Mercereau, 89 Colo. 227, 1 P.2d 101 (1931); Denver Co. v. Thompson, 65 Colo.
4, 169 Pac. 539 (1917).
28 41 Colo. 241, 92 Pac. 679 (1903).
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propagated by the maze of contradictory and inaccurate statements
enunciated by our courts regarding the nature and meaning of the
doctrine.29 The Hook decision represents another phase of this ef-
fort to rehabilitate the rule and develop it into an efficient "aide"
to the courts in a proper case calling for the application of the rule.
In the instant case, a patron of an amusement park paid her fare
and placed herself in a contrivance under the exclusive care and
control of the agents of the defendant. The plaintiff entered the de-
vice whole and emerged with a broken back. The court held that the
circumstances were inadequate to raise the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur and to carry the plaintiff's cause to the jury. Yet the Hook
decision stands on its merits as one of the clearest statements of the
facts necessary to raise the doctrine of res ipsa set forth to date by
an appellate court of this state. Whether or not such clear state-
ments of law are to be utilized as instruments of justice or exist
merely as legal abstractions is a question to be resolved in future
adjudication. One is tempted to conclude that the Hook case must
be classified with those cases in which the courts have desired to
utilize the doctrine of res ipsa to promote justice, and in so doing
have only succeeded in bringing about the defeat of justice instead..
Ken Harper
29 J. Frantz made the following observation in this respect in Weiss v. Axler, 137 Colo. at 556,.
328 P.2d at 95 (1958): "Out of this welter of confusing and chaotic commentaries selected from our
decisions there is much that is compatible with the historic concept of the principle of res ipsa loquitur.
It is the departure from this concept which has misshopened the doctrine and made its application-
uncertain."
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